I generally avoid unfalsifiable generalizations about historical epochs, but in this case I will indulge myself. I believe that Russia’s occupation and annexation of Crimea is going to prove as much of an inflection point in post-Cold War history as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Continue reading
Author Archives: Edward W. Walker
Why a settlement in the Donbas is unlikely
Last Friday, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s then President-elect (now President) Petro Poroshenko met in Normandy during the 70th anniversary of D-Day celebrations. In an interview with a Russian television station afterward, Putin stated: “I can only welcome Mr. Poroshenko’s position that the bloodshed in eastern Ukraine must be stopped immediately. I cannot say for sure how that can be implemented in practical terms, but overall it seemed to me to be the right approach.” Continue reading
Kyiv still between a rock and a hard place
The news from the Donbas over the past several days has not been good. Until about a week ago, it seemed possible that Moscow was turning a blind eye to the infiltration of the Donbas by militants from Russia but was not directly involved in organizing it. That seems much less likely now. Given the evidence, it is hard to believe that Moscow is not complicit in facilitating the movement of fighters and military equipment across the border. Continue reading
Interpreting the results of Ukraine’s presidential election
The final results of the Ukrainian presidential election May 25 will be published on June 1, but the basic outcome is clear. Petro Poroshenko won roughly 55 percent of the vote, a solid victory (as expected) that took him past the 50 percent threshold needed to avoid a second round. Moreover, as per the map below, electoral support for him was relatively evenly distributed across the country Continue reading
Misreading Russia on Ukraine: Tom Friedman in today’s New York Times
In an op-ed in today’s New York Times entitled “Putin Blinked,” Tom Friedman makes an argument that I find unconvincing, to put it mildly. It is also one that I think Western policy makers would be very unwise to embrace.
Update on the crisis: five points
1. My take is that the risk of sustained warfare in the Donbas has gone up since my last post, beginning with the ambush by pro-Russian separatists on May 22 that killed some 16 Ukrainian soldiers and injured over 30. Continue reading
Update on the crisis: where we are likely to go from here
I have been traveling in Europe for the past several weeks, which has made it difficult to keep up with developments in Ukraine in any detail, but my sense is that violence in eastern Ukraine has peaked and that Kyiv has managed to contain the uprising to parts of the Donbas. Continue reading
The uprisings in Ukraine: the known knowns, probable knowns, and known unknowns
It is difficult for someone not on site to know what is going on in a region as volatile and chaotic as Ukraine is today (although it is also true that being on site has its own information and bias problems). It is particularly difficult when the contending forces are as determined to frame events to their advantage as they are in the current crisis. Nevertheless, having followed the reporting coming out of Ukraine as closely as I could since last October, I have the following take on some of the disputed fact claims. Continue reading
Update on the crisis: a skeptic’s take on Putin’s call for a postponement of the Donbas referendum
The big news today is that Putin has called for the postponement of a referendum on what amounts to “sovereignty” for the Donbas on May 11 that had been demanded by the pro-Russian separatists and has announced that Russian troops are pulling back from the border. I am very skeptical, however, that the Kremlin genuinely wants a significant de-escalation at this point.
Reading Russia on Ukraine (2)
As I suggested at the end of my previous post, how one reads Russia on Ukraine has implications for how the West responds to the annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s destabilization of southeastern Ukraine. If the Wag the Dog school is correct, then Putin and his advisors (“cronies,” in this reading) are motivated primarily by insecurity about the stability of Putin’s regime and by fear of losing their power and privileges. Thus, it is weakness and vulnerability, not strength, that is driving Kremlin policy. And it is not NATO that worries the Kremlin most, but the risk of contagion from a democratic, liberal, pro-Western regime in Kyiv. Continue reading
Reading Russia on Ukraine (1)
I am frequently asked what is driving Russian policy toward Ukraine. Why is the Kremlin so intent on destabilizing its neighbor? Why was it so determined to keep Ukraine from signing the Association Agreement with the European Union last fall? Doesn’t Russia have an interest in a better governed, less corrupt, and more prosperous neighbor? Why so much fuss about NATO accession? Does Moscow really think that Ukraine could pose a security threat to a country that spends more on its military than any state other than the United States and that has a huge arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons? Continue reading
Chicken Little on the probability of a Russian invasion
After a brief glimmer of hope over the weekend that we might be seeing the beginning of a de-escalation of the Ukrainian crisis thanks to four party talks in Geneva, the situation on the ground has deteriorated significantly. Continue reading
The uprisings in Eastern Ukraine and Kyiv’s strategic dilemmas
The political situation in eastern Ukraine continues to deteriorate, and at this point there appear to be three possible outcomes: (1) a successful effort by Kyiv to suppress the pro-Russian forces in the east; (2) civil war – that is, large-scale and sustained violence that last months and possibly years; or (3) a Russian military intervention. In my view, the least likely outcome is the first Continue reading
Talking points on the Ukraine Crisis, April 12, 2014
What are Russia’s objectives in Ukraine?
Russia’s objectives are multiple and include domestic as well as geopolitical factors, but in my view national security concerns and geopolitical considerations are paramount. Basically, Moscow has drawn a line in the sand against any further expansion of NATO to countries on its borders, above all Ukraine. The Russians have opposed NATO expansion since its inception, but what has changed is that Moscow now has the power to block the accession of Ukraine, or indeed of any other former Soviet republic that is not already a member of the alliance. Continue reading
Carrots and sticks: a strategic response to the Ukraine crisis
EWW Talk at the Institute of Governmental Studies panel on Ukraine, University of California, Berkeley, April 11, 2014
I continue to believe that the crisis in Ukraine is extremely dangerous and that the odds of a Russian invasion before the presidential elections on May 25 are significant. Continue reading
Ukraine: divided nation, divided state
The following is a slightly edited, long version (I shortened it due to time constraints) of a talk I gave at Berkeley on March 13. I was one of four presenters on a panel on the Ukraine crisis. My charge was to discuss the internal political situation in Ukraine. Continue reading
Eurasian Geopolitics 