Category Archives: Ukraine crisis

The spillover effects in Eurasia of Russia’s economic woes

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In earlier posts I suggested that declining trend growth for the global economy is going to make for governance problems, particularly for the world’s democracies. I also argued that pre-existing economic problems for three of the four key players in the Ukraine drama – Ukraine itself, Russia, and the European Union (the exception being the United States) – are being aggravated by, and are constraining choices in, the Ukraine crisis.

What I want to focus on here is how Russia’s economic problems are impacting Russia’s neighbors and unsettling the region politically. I will leave aside Ukraine (whose acute economic problems I’ve covered in earlier posts) and the three Baltic states (which as members of the EU and the Eurozone are less affected by Russia’s downturn). Continue reading →

Whither the Donbas war after Debaltseve?

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations • 1 Comment

Yesterday, Ukrainian President Poroshenko read a brief statement at the Kyiv airport in which he announced that the Ukrainian forces in and around Debaltseve, whose main line of retreat to the north, the M03, had come under the control of the separatists a week or so earlier, had been ordered to break out and make it back to Ukrainian controlled territory. Continue reading →

Ukraine’s hostage crisis

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, NATO, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US-Russian relations

My impression is that the ceasefire called for in last week’s Minsk II agreement is being implemented along most of the line of contact. The principle exception is in the Debaltseve pocket, although there has also been some artillery/rocket exchanges in the south, in and around Donetsk/Horlivka, and near Luhansk. But with the possible exception of a Russian/separatist push to reverse the gains made by Ukraine’s Azov battalion last week in the south, I doubt that either side is pressing, for the immediate future, to make significant territorial gains. Continue reading →

What to make of Minsk 2?

Posted on by • Posted in European Union, Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations • 3 Comments

I do not believe there is any chance that yesterday’s Minsk agreement will be implemented in full. I am almost, but not quite, as skeptical that it will lead to a stable ceasefire and separation of forces.

In what follows I will make four general points about the agreement and then focus on its two key provisions: Provision 1 on a ceasefire and Provision 2 on a separation of forces. Continue reading →

The Ukraine crisis at a turning point

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations

I believe that the odds of a full-blown proxy war in Ukraine between the United States and Russia are now better than even and getting higher. Moscow believes it is already in a proxy war with the West, but it is wrong, at least in the following sense. Whereas Russian has been deeply involved in the violence in eastern Ukraine from its inception, Western military assistance to Kyiv has so far been minimal. That is likely to change if a stable ceasefire is not arranged in the next several weeks. Continue reading →

Why Kyiv and the West should be pressing for a stable frozen conflict in the Donbas

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations • 2 Comments

When the Minsk Protocol and its follow-on Memorandum were signed last September, I believed there was almost no chance that they would be fully implemented. Full implementation is even less likely now. There is, however, at least some chance that a ceasefire could take hold that would allow for a genuine “freezing” of the conflict.

However, for reasons I outlined in earlier posts (see, for example, “Why a frozen conflict in the Donbas is unlikely”), I believe that a lasting ceasefire will require at least the following: (1) Ukrainian withdrawal from beyond artillery range of Donetsk and Horlivka and northward from the Debaltseve salient; (2) agreement on a new line of demarcation; (3) agreement on the withdrawal of all forces, including but not only heavy weapons, from a buffer zone (presumably 30km wide, as per the September 19 agreement); and (4) the establishment of a peacekeeping force – for example, a joint Ukrainian/Russian/OSCE force – to patrol and monitor the buffer zone. Continue reading →

Eastern Ukraine: Whither the latest Russian/pro-Russian offensive?

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Ukraine crisis

It is now clear that a major separatist offensive is underway in eastern Ukraine. (Again, by “separatist” I mean the combination of Ukrainian rebels, irregulars from Russia and elsewhere, and Russian regulars fighting on behalf of the DPR and LPR). It also appears that the Ukrainian military is at risk of suffering another major defeat, particularly but not only in the Debaltseve salient (see map below). Moscow has again surged its regular forces in the conflict; it has introduced sophisticated weapons not seen earlier in the conflict zone; and it has provided the separatists with the huge volume of ordinance to put them in position to conduct major offensive operations. Continue reading →

A fog of war in the Donbas

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis

It remains very difficult to assess what is happening on the battlefield in eastern Ukraine amidst a great often deal of contradictory information. What is clear is that the intensity of fighting has escalated and that it is spreading and getting worse rather than abating. Of particular concern are offensive operations by the separatists along the Bakhmutka highway to the northwest of Luhansk and indeed an escalation of fighting at many points along the northern front. Continue reading →

The battle for the Donetsk airport takes an unexpected turn (and why alarm bells should be going off in Western capitals)

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations

Twenty-four hours ago, it appeared that the Donbas separatists were about to take full control of the Donetsk airport after months of often intense fighting. There was also increasing separatist pressure on Ukrainian forces all along the line of contact, particularly in the northern part of the conflict zone, as shown below on yesterday’s map from the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council’s press center. I have not been following military developments in the conflict zone very carefully recently, but my guess was that the separatists, with material and intelligence support from Moscow, were setting up to launch a major offensive against Ukrainian forces in the Debaltseve salient after taking the airport. I also thought there was a chance that Ukrainian forces would again be trapped in the salient, just as they had been in August in Ilovai’sk, and that they would again suffer heavy losses.

While information from the conflict zone is confused, it seems clear that the Ukrainian military launched a surprise counteroffensive yesterday and that it has managed to retake at least part of the airport. Continue reading →

The Ukraine crisis in 2015

Posted on by • Posted in European Union, Geopolitics, NATO, Russian foreign policy, South Caucasus, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations • 3 Comments

The Ukraine crisis is a complex drama with multiple dimensions, theaters and actors, which makes tracking, explaining, and predicting where it is headed particularly difficult. Its various parts are, however, interrelated, so while each dimension is important in its own right, it also impacts, and is impacted by, the others.

In what follows, I disaggregate the crisis to five dimensions and offer my take on what is likely to happen in each in 2015. In doing so, I will try to take into account the crisis’ “systemic” properties – that is, how the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone. Continue reading →

Original Sin: The Clinton’s administration’s commitment to NATO enlargement

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, NATO, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations

I’ve been working on a paper on NATO enlargement that is supposed to appear in February, and when it does I’ll post a link to it. Meanwhile, I want to emphasize a few broad points about the policy.

First, while there has been a good deal of discussion recently about what Western officials “promised” Gorbachev about NATO during negotiations over German reunification, the key decisions about enlargement were made after the Soviet dissolution by the Clinton administration, not the George H.W. Bush administration. What is true is that a commitment to preserve NATO as the foundation of Western security was made under Bush I, and as far as I know that commitment was supported by all NATO member-states at the time (see the 1990 London NATO Summit Declaration). The decision to enlarge NATO to take in new members other than a united Germany was made gradually, and without a lot of fanfare, by the Clinton administration over the course of 1993 and 1994. Continue reading →

Thoughts on a post-Ukraine crisis security settlement for Europe

Posted on by • Posted in CSTO, Eurasian Union, European Union, Geopolitics, Moldova, NATO, Russian foreign policy, South Caucasus, Ukraine crisis

It would be foolish for Western governments to count on changes in Russia’s position on NATO enlargement and force disposition in the foreseeable future, regardless of whether Putin remains in office. It would likewise be foolish for Moscow to count on brinkmanship and intimidation to keep NATO from reinforcing its eastern flank under current circumstance. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon Western and Russian leaders to make what is now a dangerous and unstable military standoff less unstable and less dangerous. Doing so is in the interest of both sides, and it is also the most likely path toward a gradual improvement in political relations. Continue reading →

The War of Recessions gets worse

Posted on by • Posted in Energy politics, Eurasian Union, European Union, Geopolitics, NATO, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations

The ruble closed today at just under 70 to the dollar, down 13% after falling some 10% yesterday. At one point it fell below 80 to the dollar, down almost 20%. It has now overtaken the hryvnia as the world’s worst performing currency this year. Continue reading →

US-Russia Relations and the Ukraine Crisis

Posted on by • Posted in Eurasian Union, European Union, Geopolitics, NATO, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations • 3 Comments

[Expanded and updated version of a talk given at UC Berkeley, December 2, 2014.]

I have long been an alarmist about US-Russia relations. While the relationship has seen its ups and downs, I believe the trend has been decidedly negative since the mid-1990s. I’ve also long worried about a possible clash with Russia over NATO expansion, and particularly so after the Bush Administration decided to press – albeit unsuccessfully – America’s NATO allies to offer Ukraine and Georgia Membership Action Plans at the March 2008 Bucharest NATO summit. Continue reading →

Ukraine and the Game of Thrones: Winter is Coming (Part 3: The Donbas)

Posted on by • Posted in Energy politics, Geopolitics, Ukraine crisis • Tagged

Not surprisingly given the effects of war, conditions for the civilian population in the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) are much worse than in Crimea. If the fighting continues, and if Moscow does not undertake a sustained commitment to provide humanitarian relief to the region, those conditions are likely to get much worse over the winter. Continue reading →

Ukraine and the Game of Thrones: Winter is Coming (Part 2: Crimea)

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My impression is that the effect of Russia’s annexation on material conditions in Crimea (by which I mean Crimea proper as well as Sevastopol) has been negative but not dire, at least to date. Subsides from Moscow have increased pensions and wages for government workers, but this reportedly is benefiting only about 40% of the peninsula’s two million people. Moscow is also funding some 75% of the region’s government budget (to the tune of at least $1.5 billion per year), an even higher percentage than the roughly 66% Kyiv covered before annexation. (I should note that all of the dollar estimates in what follows were made before the full extent of the ruble’s decline, which means that in dollar terms costs will be higher.)

This year, Russian officials have indicated that Moscow will provide some $4.5 billion to Crimea. They have also announced that some $7.2 billion will be taken out of the Russian pension fund to help cover the costs of annexation. These commitments are obviously yet one more burden on an already burdened federal budget, but they have helped ameliorate, albeit not negate, financial hardships for much of the region’s population. Continue reading →

Ukraine and the Game of Thrones: Winter is Coming (Part 1: Introduction)

Posted on by • Posted in Energy politics, Geopolitics, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis

As the crisis in Ukraine intensified late last year, analysts pointed to an asymmetry in the struggle between Russia and the West over Ukraine’s external orientation. The Kremlin, the argument went, cares a great deal more about keeping Ukraine in its orbit than does either the European Union or the United States. That was certainly true then, and although it is rather less true now that Western governments feel fundamental principles and security are at stake, it is still mostly true. Continue reading →

Why the Ukraine crisis is getting even more dangerous

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, NATO, Russian foreign policy, Ukraine crisis, US foreign policy, US-Russian relations

It is safe to say that I have been an alarmist about the conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine’s external orientation (my wife tells me I should call this the “Doom and Gloom” blog). I have been worried for years that NATO and EU expansion was going to lead eventually to a security crisis. I was worried about the consequences of Georgia and Ukraine trying to join NATO well before the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and even more worried thereafter. And I was worried about the political fallout from the decision to offer Ukraine an EU Association Agreement in Vilnius at the end of last year and Russia’s reaction should the Yanukovich regime fall. Continue reading →

Why a “frozen conflict” in eastern Ukraine is unlikely

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, NATO, Ukraine crisis, US-Russian relations • 7 Comments

As readers of this blog are aware, I believe that Moscow’s Ukraine policy has been driven primarily by geopolitical concerns rather than fear of democratic contagion. Above all, the Kremlin has been, and remains, determined to keep Ukraine out of NATO. It is only slightly less determined to keep Ukraine out of the European Union and to prevent NATO from building up its eastern defenses. And it probably still hopes that Ukraine can eventually be persuaded, or forced, to cast its lot with Russia rather than with Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

At the same time, the Kremlin has made clear that it will pursue its strategic objectives in Ukraine using all means at its disposal short of war with the West. It has also made clear that it has a high tolerance for risk.

What is not clear, however, is how the Kremlin’s strategic objectives and tactics are linked. Continue reading →

Ukraine: Lessons learned from other “frozen conflicts” in the Soviet successor states

Posted on by • Posted in Geopolitics, Moldova, South Caucasus, Ukraine crisis • 1 Comment

[The following is an expanded version of a talk I gave at the VoxUkraine Club, Kyiv, October 23.]

SUMMARY

Four constants

  1. None of the conflicts has been resolved peacefully
  2. Each “parent state” has lost all de facto sovereignty over the breakaway region
  3. In no case has the international community been successful in mediating a political settlement
  4. In no case has there been significant repatriation of internally displaced persons

Three variables that don’t vary much

  1. All the breakaway regions are doing poorly economically, with some variation
  2. All the breakaway states are dependent on external patron states, with some variation
  3. All the breakaway states have a “stateness” problem, with some variation

Four importantly varying variables

  1. The “resolution” of the Chechen case
  2. The cultural-political distance between the contending parties
  3. Public determination in the parent state to retake the lost territories
  4. The extent of cooperation between the parent state and the breakaway state

Continue reading →